An Authorization Manager is an instance of the AuthManager class that is plugged into one of the Feast servers to extract user details from the current request and inject them into the permission framework.
Note: Feast does not provide authentication capabilities; it is the client's responsibility to manage the authentication token and pass it to the Feast server, which then validates the token and extracts user details from the configured authentication server.
Two authorization managers are supported out-of-the-box:
One using a configurable OIDC server to extract the user details.
One using the Kubernetes RBAC resources to extract the user details.
These instances are created when the Feast servers are initialized, according to the authorization configuration defined in their own feature_store.yaml.
Feast servers and clients must have consistent authorization configuration, so that the client proxies can automatically inject the authorization tokens that the server can properly identify and use to enforce permission validations.
The server-side implementation of the authorization functionality is defined here. Few of the key models, classes to understand the authorization implementation on the client side can be found here.
The authorization is configured using a dedicated auth section in the feature_store.yaml configuration.
Note: As a consequence, when deploying the Feast servers with the Helm charts, the feature_store_yaml_base64 value must include the auth section to specify the authorization configuration.
This configuration applies the default no_auth authorization:
With OIDC authorization, the Feast client proxies retrieve the JWT token from an OIDC server (or Identity Provider) and append it in every request to a Feast server, using an Authorization Bearer Token.
The server, in turn, uses the same OIDC server to validate the token and extract the user roles from the token itself.
Some assumptions are made in the OIDC server configuration:
The OIDC token refers to a client with roles matching the RBAC roles of the configured Permissions (*)
The roles are exposed in the access token that is passed to the server
The JWT token is expected to have a verified signature and not be expired. The Feast OIDC token parser logic validates for verify_signature and verify_exp so make sure that the given OIDC provider is configured to meet these requirements.
The preferred_username should be part of the JWT token claim.
(*) Please note that the role match is case-sensitive, e.g. the name of the role in the OIDC server and in the Permission configuration must be exactly the same.
For example, the access token for a client app of a user with reader role should have the following resource_access section:
An example of feast OIDC authorization configuration on the server side is the following:
In case of client configuration, the following settings username, password and client_secret must be added to specify the current user:
Below is an example of feast full OIDC client auth configuration:
With Kubernetes RBAC Authorization, the client uses the service account token as the authorizarion bearer token, and the server fetches the associated roles from the Kubernetes RBAC resources.
An example of Kubernetes RBAC authorization configuration is the following:
NOTE: This configuration will only work if you deploy feast on Openshift or a Kubernetes platform.
```yaml project: my-project auth: type: kubernetes ... ```
In case the client cannot run on the same cluster as the servers, the client token can be injected using the LOCAL_K8S_TOKEN environment variable on the client side. The value must refer to the token of a service account created on the servers cluster and linked to the desired RBAC roles.
To ensure the Kubernetes RBAC environment aligns with Feast's RBAC configuration, follow these guidelines:
The roles defined in Feast Permission instances must have corresponding Kubernetes RBAC Role names.
The Kubernetes RBAC Role must reside in the same namespace as the Feast service.
The client application can run in a different namespace, using its own dedicated ServiceAccount.
Finally, the RoleBinding that links the client ServiceAccount to the RBAC Role must be defined in the namespace of the Feast service.
If the above rules are satisfied, the Feast service must be granted permissions to fetch RoleBinding instances from the local namespace.